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Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to analyse nonprofit regulation through comparing and 
contrasting mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities. It ascertains how these entities differ in 
size, publicness, tax benefits and whether these differences might suggest regulatory costs 
should be differentiated. 
Design/methodology/approach: This mixed-methods study utilises financial data, 
submissions and interviews. 
Findings: There are stark differences in these two types of regulated nonprofit entities. 
Members should be the primary monitoring agency/ies for mutual-benefit entities, but 
financial reports should be understandable to these members.  Nevertheless, the availability 
of tax concessions, combined with the benefits of limited liability, suggest mutual-benefit 
entities should be regulated and monitored by government in a way sympathetic to their size.  
Research limitations/implications: As with most research, a limitation is this study’s focus 
on a single jurisdiction. 
Practical implications: The differences in these entities’ characteristics are important for 
designing regulation.   
Social implications: Better regulation is likely to require a standard set of financial reporting 
standards.  Government has the right to demand disclosures due to benefits mutual-benefit 
entities enjoy.  
Originality/value: In comparison to studies utilising only public benefit data, this study uses 
unique datasets to compare public-benefit and mutual-benefit entities and presents nonprofit 
sector participant’s perceptions of these differences in context. This enables analysis of how 
better regulation could be achieved. 
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Nonprofit Regulatory reform: distinguishing between mutual-benefit and 
public-benefit entities 
1. Introduction 
Increasingly, regulation has become an important theme for research, particularly due to 
regulation’s ability to drive behaviour (Fischer and Marsh, 2012). While the private and 
public sectors are frequently the focus of regulatory reform research, this is not so for the 
nonprofit sector. Regulation of nonprofit entities often aims to redistribute taxes by 
exempting these bodies. It also seeks to protect a donative and member-joining public whose 
support of nonprofit entities underpins national culture.   
Nevertheless, nonprofit regulation has been criticised for its inconsistency. For example, 
in the United States (US) more than three decades ago, Hansmann (1986, p. 82) called for 
“lawmakers to review and reform the hodge-podge of organizational and regulatory law that 
applies to nonprofits to ensure that it is well-designed to assist nonprofits in serving [social] 
needs”. While Breen et al. (2017) suggest ‘waves’ of regulation and self-regulation, the 
challenge of untangling regulation in different nonprofit segments has been largely ignored.  
Many regulatory statutes are longstanding (e.g. Cordery et al., 2016), but there is a push for 
Better Regulation, i.e. reforms that would reduce the impost of regulation on entities ((Bunea 
amd Ibenskas, 2017; De Jong and Van Witteloostuijn, 2015). Nevertheless, while a number 
of tools exist to rethink and improve regulation (Deighton-Smith, 2008), few studies of 
‘sunsetting’ (repealing and reinvigorating older statutes) are available, a matter we seek to 
address. 
This research concentrates on nonprofit regulatory issues, in particular (what regulatees 
perceive to be the onerous task of) financial filing (Flack and Ryan, 2005). It focuses on the 
‘sunsetting’ of an Act through which mutual-benefit (membership) entities can take legal 
form and be registered, and the proposed requirements to require them to follow specific 
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nonprofit accounting standards for their regulatory filings. The research addresses a gap in 
scholarship on nonprofit issues and public administration, which typically focuses on public-
benefit entities (for example, registered charities in Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom (UK) and 501(c)(3) entities in the US (Wagner, 2012)). Yet, mutual-benefit 
(membership) entities (such as incorporated societies) increasingly comprise a significant 
proportion of nonprofit entities. In many countries, nonprofit income is tax-exempt, although 
only public-benefit entities can release taxation rebates on donations received (Abramson et 
al., 2006; Weisbrod, 1989).1 This may be a reason that nonprofit mutual-benefit entities are 
regulated, but should they be held to similar public interest standards as public-benefit 
entities?     
Research has analysed regulation of for-profit organisations, specifically that which 
seeks to reduce information asymmetry and also in terms of accounting standard-setting 
(Fischer and Marsh, 2012). Nonprofit public-benefit entities are increasingly regulated 
(Cordery et al., 2017), yet little is known about their counterpart mutual-benefit entities’ 
finances2 and whether regulatory reform should be more invasive or, following Better 
Regulation proposals, less.3  
This research compares and contrasts nonprofit mutual-benefit and public-benefit 
entities, asking: (i) How do these entities differ in terms of revenue sources – are members 
largely in control?, (ii) What differences exist in the beneficiaries of mutual-benefit compared 
to public-benefit entities – are they public or private?, (iii) What is the extent of different 
entities’ relative tax exemptions on surpluses and investments?, and (iv) What differences 
might suggest regulatory costs (e.g. red tape) should be differentiated?   
                                                             
1  Although some public-benefit entities have members, they differ from mutual-benefit entities due to their 
public-benefit mission (Cordery et al., 2017; Quarter et al., 2001; Wagner, 2012). 
2  Many nonprofit entities are also unincorporated (Cordery et al., 2016; Hansmann, 1986), are not regulated 
and have fluid boundaries. Research into the finances of these arrangements is also necessary. 
3  See section 2.3 for a discussion of these proposals.  
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New Zealand is a useful site for research as it is an early and focused adopter of New 
Public Management (NPM) ideals, and Better Regulation reforms (Kelsey, 2010). It allows a 
natural experiment to answer the research questions, as the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 
facilitates incorporation of a wide range of membership-based public- and mutual-benefit 
entities (Cordery et al., 2016).4 Yet, this Act is at odds to the Charities Act 2005 (updated in 
2013) which now demands public-benefit entities follow new financial reporting standards. 
Hence, the Incorporated Societies Act 1908 is being redeveloped and proposes increased 
demands of mutual-benefit entities. As this research concentrates on the regulatory 
requirements for financial filing, it utilises a random sample of smaller (< NZD2m 
expenditure) mutual-benefit entities from the Incorporated Societies register, comparing their 
financial transactions to a similar sized sample of charities registered under the Charities Act 
2005. In relation to the sunsetting of this Act, the research also analyses public submissions 
to the Exposure Draft of the Incorporated Societies Bill (Ministry of Business Innovation & 
Employment, 2015) in particular, those related to the financial filing requirements. Ten 
interviews with experts (see Appendix 1) augment the submissions and expose preferences on 
mutual-benefit entities’ regulatory filing obligations.   
Recognising diffusion of regulatory policy and practice reforms (Breen et al., 2017) 
through such movements as Better Regulation, this research contributes to literature on 
nonprofit regulation and the potential impact of regulatory reform. It also highlights the 
failings of old legislation that needs more than incremental change.  
First, the distinction between nonprofit public-benefit and mutual-benefit entities is made 
and secondly, reasons for regulation through disclosure, considered.  The context and data is 
explained and findings presented. These suggest how a ‘hodge-podge’ of nonprofit regulation 
                                                             
4  Currently, 28% of Incorporated Societies are registered charities (public-benefit entities) and 72% are 
mutual-benefit entities. Of registered charities, 37% were Incorporated Societies (the remainder are 
unincorporated charitable trusts, or limited liability companies (Cordery et al., 2016). 
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can be reformed, through analysis of club theory (underpinning mutual-benefit entities) and 
the relative need to ensure public-benefit entities act in the public interest. The discussion and 
conclusion include limitations and future research opportunities.   
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Categorising nonprofit entities 
This research focuses on membership organisations (a nonprofit subsector), particularly those 
choosing to take legal form. Buchanan’s (1965) economic theory of club goods expects 
membership clubs are “a voluntary group deriving mutual benefits from sharing one or more 
of the following: production costs, the members’ characteristics, or a good characterized by 
excludable benefits” (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997, p. 335). The entity can (relatively 
cheaply) prevent non-fee-paying individuals from consuming club goods as opposed to 
freely-available public goods. Club goods may be enjoyed by one person at a time (rivalrous) 
or many (non-rivalrous). Club theory assumes that members, who receive the majority of the 
entity’s benefits, should be the major funders as the club produces only incidental societal 
benefits (Buchanan, 1965; Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997). Potoski and Prakash (2007) further 
note that members also benefit from social externalities, such as credibility from belonging to 
a professional association, or following externally established rules.  
Members also form nonprofit entities, as information asymmetry for non-members limits 
consumers’ ability to assess service quality (Ben-Ner, 1986; Howell and Cordery, 2013). 
Public- and mutual- benefit entities can inspire users’ trust in the quality of their goods when 
it cannot be directly observed (Ben-Ner, 1986; Hansmann, 1986). Further, public-benefit 
entities can redistribute societal wealth, to “reduce the burden on state funds, increase 
community resilience and encourage civil society” (Cordery et al., 2017, p. 2).   
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Johnson (2014) notes a paucity of research into mutual-benefit entities (associations), 
although Fraussen and Halpin’s (2016) Australian study discusses the diversity of national 
advocacy associations. They categorise associations as advocacy groups (citizens with issues, 
business and professional associations, and trade-unions) and ‘other’ (service delivery 
entities, leisure associations, political parties/think-tanks/research organisations who shape 
public policy).5 A variety of terms is used, with Steinberg (2007) classifying membership 
entities’ missions as: instrumental (service-delivery) and expressive (cultural and advocacy).   
Hansmann (1986) dichotomises entities by funding as: ‘donative’ (mainly donations), 
and ‘commercial’ (mainly goods and services). Alternative research on mutual-benefit 
entities’ funding is scarce, although Cordery et al. (2017) largely confirm Hansmann’s (1986) 
general categories, suggesting the categorisation drives entity control, and members should 
manage/regulate mutual-benefit entities. Quarter et al. (2001) also find Canadian mutual-
benefit entities receive more commercial and less government revenues on average, than 
public-benefit entities.6 However, mutual-benefit entities (sports clubs) in many European 
countries receive up to ten percent of their funding from government (Sotiriadou and Wicker, 
2013). 
Hansmann (1986) also dichotomises nonprofit entities into: member-controlled 
(mutuals), or independently managed (‘entrepreneurial’). Johnson’s (2014) analysis of 
national associations across four different countries instead contrasts mutuals with 
professional associations (with no members). These studies do not analyse income, structure, 
or regulation. In summary, table 1 extends club theory to highlight the main differences 
between these entities. 
                                                             
5  These latter two may also be advocacy organisations, although Fraussen and Halpin (2016) omitted them. 
6  Canadian mutual-benefit entities were deemed more democratic but have less volunteer participation than 
public-benefit entities. 
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[Table 1 here] 
Following prior research into public-benefit entity regulation (e.g. Cordery et al., 2017), 
this research asks: to what extent do mutual-benefit entity finances also suggest member or 
professional control?  To more fully understand the activities (goods and services delivered), 
it further questions: what differences exist in the beneficiaries of mutual-benefit compared to 
public-benefit entities?  
2.2 Regulating nonprofit entities 
Charities (public-benefit entities) receive taxation concessions as they provide societal 
benefits and thus may assist in redistributing wealth (Fleischer, 2010; Hansmann, 1986). 
Hence charity regulation seeks to ensure they continue to act in the public interest.  For 
example, Stewart and Faulk (2014, p. 630) highlight how requiring foundations to make 
certain distributions has succeeded in ensuring these public-benefit entities’ “assets do not 
accumulate uncontrolled or directly benefit individuals related to the foundation”.  
Other nonprofit entities (including mutual-benefit entities) are also exempt from income 
taxes because they develop the arts, culture and social capital (Fleischer, 2010).7 Income tax 
benefits for nonprofit entities often link to a non-distribution constraint, and in many 
jurisdictions, these entities may also receive tax deductions/rebates from, for example, debt 
interest, sales and property tax (Abramson et al., 2006). Although allowing re-distribution of 
public funds to issues citizens also support, rebates can be problematic. Thiel and Mayer 
(2009) note that the German Federal Finance Office was concerned that tax relief  was being 
extended to some sports clubs that had strong customer and for-profit orientations , rather 
                                                             
7  Nevertheless, Yetman and Yetman (2009) note these entities must pay tax on unrelated taxable revenues and 
chasing these revenues could risk an entity’s nonprofit status. 
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than nonprofit orientations.8 Nevertheless, regulatory oversight should extend beyond 
taxation (Breen et al., 2017). 
Hansmann’s (1986) concern that US nonprofit regulation is a ‘hodge-podge’ reflects 
contextually and temporally specific regulatory aspects. In the US, the Internal Revenue 
Service regulates both 501(c)(3) organisations (charities providing donors with tax-
deductions) and 501(c)(4) organisations that may engage in lobbying but do not afford donors 
a tax deduction (Baber, Roberts, & Visvanathan, 2001). Other nonprofit forms exist with 
varying regulation. In European jurisdictions, governments often regulate associations (as 
nonprofit entities), irrespective of their public- or mutual-benefit (DiMaggio and Anheier, 
1990). Similarly in New Zealand, charities (public-benefit) are regulated within the 
Department of Internal Affairs (by Charities Services), and (non-charitable) incorporated 
mutual-benefit entities are regulated within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment (by the Incorporated Societies Registrar) (Cordery et al., 2016).  In Australia, 
while public-benefit entities must register and make disclosures with the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-profits Commission, mutual-benefit entities are subject only to variable State 
regulations.  
Elsewhere, regulation focuses only on charitable (public-benefit) entities. For instance, 
the Canadian Crown Revenue Office requires charities to file, but the Not-for-profit 
Corporations Act 2010 does not require mutual-benefit entities to make financial disclosures 
to a regulator.9 Their members are expected to govern mutual-benefit entities, making them 
internally focused (Quarter et al., 2001). In the UK, charities are regulated jurisdictionally, 
but no organisational form exists for mutual-benefit entities (Cordery et al., 2016).   
                                                             
8  In some jurisdictions, donors to public-benefit entities also may receive tax deductions, but not for 
donations to mutual-benefit entities.   
9  Information sourced from https://www.ontario.ca/page/guide-not-profit-corporations-act-2010 
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Whether regulated or not, there is concern that entities may be victims of fraud 
(Tremblay-Boire et al., 2016), especially when they receive taxation concessions and the 
public purse is impacted. As regulatory monitoring should reduce fraud (including tax fraud), 
it is important to understand the potential tax foregone (for example, in respect of surpluses 
and investments).   
2.3 Disclosure and regulation 
Regulators seek to reduce information asymmetry, often requiring additional disclosures and 
especially financial statements (Breen, 2013; Solomons, 1978). Charity regulators typically 
require public-benefit entities to register, file financial returns, and, at certain levels, be 
audited (as presaged by Solomons, 1978). Calabrese’s (2011) US study of public-benefit 
entities finds that audited entities provide more information, which is of better quality, 
highlighting monitoring’s role in regulation (Stewart and Faulk, 2014).   
The Better Regulation agenda suggests that regulation imposes burdensome 
administrative costs (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2017; De Jong and Van Witteloostuijn, 2015). 
Accordingly, techniques, including the Standard Cost Model and Regulatory Impact 
Assessments attend new regulation to ensure costs do not exceed the benefits (Coletti and 
Radaelli, 2013). Deregulation is also important for Better Regulation reforms, being typically 
achieved through resorting to markets (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2017). While a charities 
regulator can inform a ‘donation market’ (Cordery et al., 2017), such a market lacks the 
efficiency of for-profit markets.   
Members have a self-regulatory role (Cordery et al., 2017); self-regulation can lead to 
statutory deregulation, or the state stepping-back (Breen et al., 2017). Yet, Bartle and Vass 
(2007, p. 902) highlight self-regulation’s potential for regulatory capture, noting: “the state is 
critical for effective operation of [regulated entities’] accountability”. Inferentially, members’ 
regulation is more efficient when government further monitors goals such as income 
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redistribution and fraud prevention. Further, despite economic and demographic change 
causing significant membership decline, the number and competition between mutual-benefit 
entities (in the UK) has increased (McCulloch, 2013). Putnam’s (1995) US study suggests 
membership falls show declining civic-ness, but the literature has not considered whether 
these fewer members perceive they are co-regulators with the state. However, the evidence 
from the for-profit sector suggests that regulation cost, inconsistency and regulatory change 
may exacerbate these regulated entities’ poor performance (De Jong and Van Witteloostuijn, 
2015). 
Where should the balance of regulation lie between increasing entities’ disclosure 
requirements (allowing the public and regulator to monitor them to reduce fraud, support the 
tax base and protect members) and the consequent increased regulatory costs? While some 
regulatory reform has occurred since Hansmann (1986) stated it was a ‘hodge-podge’ in the 
US, is harmonisation the answer? What key differences (if any) exist between these entity 
types and do they suggest the need for differentiated re-regulation? 
3. Method 
The research utilises mixed methods which are described along with the research context. 
3.1 Context and quantitative data 
The quantitative analysis utilised two data sets from New Zealand regulators. The first was 
initially used by Cordery et al. (2017), being a stratified random sample of 829 smaller 
charities from the Charities Register. The New Zealand Charities Commission, established 
under the Charities Act 2005, was abolished as an independent Crown Entity in 2012 and is 
now named Charities Services, within the Department of Internal Affairs. Under the Charities 
Act 2005, entities that are deemed to be charities can be registered if they demonstrate that 
they act in the public interest and carry out charitable activities, that is the: relief of poverty, 
advancement of education, advancement of religion or other purposes beneficial to the 
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community (Charities Act, 2005 2012 s.5(1)). Each charity must annually disclose standard 
financial information and file financial statements. Summary data and statements are 
downloadable and Charities Services publishes regular information of the size and reach of 
the approximately 27,000 registered charities in New Zealand. The majority of registered 
charities are small (with expenditure of less than NZD40,000). The sample taken in 2012 was 
stratified by population (those with less than NZD40,000 in expenditure and those with 
between NZD40,000 and NZD2,000,000 in expenditure) and, within each population stratum, 
by the sector that charities selected upon filing their financial statements.10 Public-benefit 
entities with zero expenditure were excluded from analysis, resulting in 796 entities in total 
for which the financial data was hand collected.   
The second data set was taken from the Incorporated Societies register in 2015 and 
included only mutual-benefit entities that were not also registered charities. The Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908 allows nonprofit entities’ members to enjoy the benefits of limited 
liability and perpetual succession, and almost 24,000 entities do so. Upon registering, 
incorporated societies must have at least 15 members. Entities are required to file financial 
statements of annual income and expenditure and the society’s assets and liabilities at year-
end (Incorporated Societies Act, 1908, s.23), although cash accounts are often filed. No audit 
is required unless the entity’s constitution demands it. The Act was concerned to ensure 
members’ funds were not diverted or lost (Cordery et al., 2016). Incorporated society’s 
financial statements can be downloaded, but neither digital summaries nor detail about the 
population are available from the registrar. While the registrar sends reminders to entities that 
fail to file the required financial reports, the regulator is perceived to be relatively inactive.  
These two forms are summarised in table 2. 
                                                             
10  These two dollar amounts were used by the regulator when it was reviewing the requirements it sought to 
impose upon public-benefit entities. (NZD40,000 is approximately GBP21,400; NZD2 million is 
approximately GBP1,070,000.)   
12 
 
[Table 2 here] 
Unsurprisingly, reforms were begun to update the Act that is more than a century old, 
including to bring entities’ financial reporting in line with current ‘best practice’. The new 
Bill was foreshadowed by a Law Commission report, government’s response and an 
Exposure Draft seeking feedback before the Bill was tabled in Parliament (Ministry of 
Business Innovation & Employment, 2015; New Zealand Law Commission, 2013). The 
purposes of this Bill were to provide for incorporation of entities not seeking financial gain, 
to promote high quality governance “and recognise the principles that (i) societies are 
organisations with members who have the primary responsibility for holding the society to 
account; and (ii) societies are private bodies that should be self-governing and free from 
inappropriate Government interference; and (iii) societies should not distribute profits or 
financial benefits to their members” (Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment, 2015, 
s.3(d)). Due to the change of Government in 2017, the reform has been delayed, but is still 
ongoing.11 
This research sought to understand how mutual-benefit entities differ from registered 
public-benefit entities (charities), and what the impost of regulation should be. As the 
Incorporated Societies register is operated differently from the Charities register, a stratified 
sample was not possible, therefore a simple random sample was taken. First the registration 
number of all societies as at August 2015 (23,695) was obtained, and any societies that were 
also registered charities were deleted (6,847). Following this, the financial accounts for the 
prior year (up to 30 November 2015) were downloaded. Some were rejected as the entities 
had failed to file and had been struck off, other societies were new and had not yet filed 
statements. Also societies with zero expenditure were discarded (estimated at 3,910 across 
                                                             
11 See: ‘Next Steps’ http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/business/business-law/incorporated-societies 
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the whole population).  The final sample from the remaining population of 12,928 was 744 
incorporated societies (5.75% of the total number of registered incorporated societies).  
3.2 Descriptive data  
Table 3 shows the summary data on the expenditure break-points for the two samples.   
[Table 3 here] 
3.3 Qualitative data  
Two complementary qualitative data sets augmented the quantitative dataset. Ten interviews 
were undertaken in early 2016 with persons who were knowledgeable about the proposed 
changes to the Incorporated Societies Act and specifically the accounting (and therefore 
filing) changes proposed (see Appendix 1). Interviewees were provided with the results of 
analysis into the financial shape of incorporated societies compared to registered charities 
(see, for example Figures 1 and 2). Their views were sought on what regulation they 
perceived to be useful. Ethics approval was obtained for these interviews and each interview 
(lasting approximately one hour) was transcribed and made available to the interviewees. 
Interviewees also had access to a report on this study prepared for the accounting standards 
regulator before it was published, to detect possible errors.   
In addition, submissions on the Exposure Draft of the Incorporated Societies Bill were 
analysed. Table 4 shows there were 114 submissions from a range of individuals and entities 
including on accounting and auditing issues. These submissions to this Bill (which were 
made available in March 2017) also covered numerous legal issues relating to incorporated 
societies’ operations. This paper analysed submissions on the proposal that incorporated 
societies be required to make financial disclosures which comply with the same accounting 
standards mandated for registered charities. (Audit is not to be mandated.) Quotes reveal 
submitters’ identities as the submissions are publically available.  
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Table 4 shows that 90.6% (77/85) of those that commented on support or otherwise of 
the bill, did support it, albeit with suggestions on various clauses. Individuals, Sports and 
Culture Associations and Professional Associations were less likely to support it (ranging 
from 83% to 88%) but 29 submitters did not make an overt statement of support or otherwise. 
Both accounting and audit issues were raised across the range of submitters. 
[Table 4 here] 
These two qualitative data sets were developed to augment the quantitative data which 
could show differences but not the opinions of regulated entities and their advisors. They 
were maintained and analysed using NVivo and codes and constructs derived from the 
literature reviewed.    
 
4. Results 
The literature expects that mutual- and public-benefit entities will differ in respect of: i) who 
receives benefits from the goods and services the entity produces; and ii) who funds the 
entity. However, the literature is ambiguous on whether: iii) taxation foregone is similar or 
differs between entities (which impacts whether regulation should protect public funds); and 
iv) whether other differences would suggest a different balance for the costs and benefits of 
regulation between mutual- and public-benefit entities (i.e. differentiated regulation).  
4.1 To what extent do members or the public receive benefits?  
First, the activities undertaken by these two samples of entities was assessed. Charities are 
required to select a main sector when they register as shown in table 5. This table provides 
this data for the population and sample of public-benefit entities. The sample of mutual-
benefit entities was similarly analysed (no population data was available).  
[Table 5 here] 
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Table 5 shows significant differences in the activities undertaken by public-benefit and 
the sample of mutual-benefit entities (p < 0.0005). Public-benefit entities are significantly 
less likely to select Culture/recreation, Law, Advocacy and politics, and Business and 
professional associations, but are significantly more likely to be involved in Education and 
research, Health, Social services, Grant-making/fundraising and volunteering promotion, 
Religion, and Other. This is unsurprising, as mutual-benefit entities in Culture/recreation, 
Law, Advocacy and politics, and Business and professional associations are likely not to be 
able to show a public-benefit focus to gain registration as a charity (mutual-benefit entity). 
There are no statistically significant differences between the two entity types selecting 
Environment or Development and Housing activities, with the former representing a small 
percentage of the sample. 
Differences are also evident when analysing how these entities spend their funds – 
whether primarily on members or public benefits. Table 6 shows that public-benefit entities 
spend significantly more resources on fundraising costs, grants, staff, overheads, and other (p, 
0.0005). In contrast, mutual-benefit entities spend significantly more resources on member 
costs (i.e. affiliation fees, bad debts) and goods and services – typically delivered to members 
(p, 0.0005). These results were verified by using the Wilcoxon test which showed all 
differences were highly significant except for ‘other’ (p = 0.012, being significant).   
[Table 6 here] 
[Figure 1 here] 
Figure 1 shows graphically the public nature of the majority of public-benefit entities’ 
expenditure, compared to member-based expenditure in mutual-benefit entities. Revenue and 
expenditure items suggest members are largely in control of mutual-benefit entities. 
Therefore it is likely that allowing members to monitor these entities rather than government 
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would be efficient (Cordery et al., 2017). A submitter concurred that members should self-
regulate, stating:  
Since for the most part, the smallest incorporated societies will be mutual-benefit 
organisations, there is no wider public policy interest in subjecting them to external 
financial scrutiny beyond what currently occurs. (Clan Keith in New Zealand) 
While the notion of public-benefit from non-rivalrous goods was not raised, there was an 
acknowledgement that many mutual-benefit entities: 
… have trading with members and trading with non-members.  Tax [should be] paid on 
profits made on trading with non-members. Because [trading] is done on profit a lot of 
organisations would think: “do I have to split this out? Yes, I do.”. (A1) 
A further argument for splitting member and non-member expenditures (A2), is that: 
… It is member’s money and so they should be trying to spend it on their 
members, which is the point of the organisation. (A3) 
Therefore, although non-members may receive incidental benefits (which they are charged 
for), members are the key beneficiaries of mutual benefit entities’ activities.  
 
4.2 How do the finances show that entities are under professional or member control?  
Table 7 shows that public-benefit entities receive significantly more resources from public 
donations, rental, bequests, investments, and other (p < 0.0005). In contrast, mutual-benefit 
entities receive significantly more resources from members, sales of goods and services, and 
sponsorship (p < 0.0005). These results were verified by using the Wilcoxon test which 
showed all differences to be highly significant (p < 0.0005), except for Rental revenue (p = 
0.857). This suggests the differences in means are influenced by a few large outliers in the 
public-benefit entities.   
[Table 7 here] 
[Figure 2 here] 
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Figure 2 shows graphically the public nature of the majority of public-benefit entities’ 
funding compared to members’ funding of mutual-benefit entities. An interviewee noted that, 
while mutual-benefit entities are membership groups:  
… in contrast, a [public-benefit entity] is not a membership group generally, it is 
for a cause.  So if you are looking at a membership group you need to look at what 
are the needs of the members, what do they want? (A4) 
Indeed, they:  
… are a bit different [from public-benefit entities], in that they have members and 
are accountable to them and they don’t want the wider world poking about in their 
finances.  (A3)  
As the revenue streams show, mutual-benefit entities are mainly funded and therefore also 
run by members rather than the profesionals that run public-benefit entities funded by the 
public and government.  
4.3 What are mutual-benefits’ potential tax exemptions compared to public-benefit 
entities? 
As none of these entities is required to file tax returns that would allow a comparison of 
public benefits allowed to each type of entity, possible answers to this question must be 
inferred. An assessment of the surplus (and relevant tax) as well as the tax foregone on 
reserves, is used to proxy for the taxation comparison (using 28 percent which is the New 
Zealand company tax rate) as shown in table 8. Mutual-benefit entities had a number of 
outliers, and therefore the Wilcoxon non-parametric test was used to compare the medians of 
the two groups, which were significantly different.   
[Table 8 here] 
Median surplus was significantly different between the mutual-benefit and public-benefit 
entities (Wilcoxon test, Z = -3.120, p = 0.002). Mutual-benefit entities make smaller 
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surpluses than public-benefit entities. The proxy for taxation foregone (the company rate of 
28% of total surplus) also shows that mutual-benefit entities benefit by only a tenth of that 
enjoyed by charities in a similar expenditure band.   
An assessment of reserves also shows significantly different median reserves between 
mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities (Wilcoxon test, Z = -2.880, p = 0.004). The median 
for mutual-benefit entities was 9 months, compared to almost 10 months (9.95) for public-
benefit entities. Calabrese’s (2013) study of US public-benefit entities noted median reserves 
of one month. Hence this study’s entities are wealthier than his sample, but the mutual-
benefit entities in this study have lower reserves than the public-benefit entities, suggesting 
less hoarding of the lower surpluses they make.   
4.4 What size differences might suggest regulatory costs should be reduced? 
Organisational size is an important measure for nonprofit research (Prentice, 2016) allowing 
comparisons - especially the assessment of the capacity of an entity to comply with 
regulatory requirements. Prentice (2016) noted that Gross Revenue, Gross Expenditure and 
Total Assets are the most commonly used size metrics. Table 9 shows that the population of 
the mutual-benefit entities is smaller than the public-benefit entities and includes Total 
Liabilities and Total Equity as further comparative size factors.  The Wilcoxon test also 
supports this finding. It can be concluded that public-benefit entities are significantly larger 
than mutual-benefit entities. 
[Table 9 here] 
While the mutual-benefit sector includes large sports entities, professional bodies, 
industry training organisations etc. (A2), it is evident that, in general, mutual-benefit entities 
are considerably smaller than public-benefit entities, make smaller profits and hold lower 
reserves. This raises the question of whether they have the capacity or desire to be regulated 
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as public-benefit entities are. One interviewee echoed the thoughts of many discussing 
compliance costs, relating on a mutual-benefit entity he was involved with: 
… given the really tiny turnover …. What we have [in financial reporting] at the moment 
works, given our size. The thought of having to change that for a $3-4000 turnover makes 
zero sense. My personal view would be to have a floor under which people would not have 
to comply. You would still have to lodge accounts with the registrar, however you can use 
any accounts you like. (C1) 
Submitters also highlighted this concern. Eighteen favoured the proposals for all mutual-
benefit entities to file and to follow the new public-benefit entity standards (these require 
accrual accounting above $125,000 in expenditure and cash accounting below that).  For 
example, those in favour of regulation requiring all entities to file using 21st century 
standards, highlighted the benefits of incorporation: 
…Federated Mountain Clubs has among its members small clubs which are Incorporated 
and have turnovers less than $5000. While it may appear onerous to require a return from 
small societies, Federated Mountain Clubs believes that if a club wants the protection and 
advantages of being an Incorporated Society then the club must accept some duties 
associated with this privilege... (Federated Mountain Clubs) 
Legal structure is a privilege providing various benefits and protections, and a choice. As 
such we see a basic level of financial accountability and transparency as a quid pro quo 
for this privilege. (RSM) (Accounting Firm) 
Others recognised that often the current practice is poor, and requiring standardised reporting 
would benefit members: 
… It is true that the imposition of reporting against the tiers is likely to cause worry and 
some difficulty for smaller clubs, particularly in the recruitment of Treasurers. However, 
the introduction of a financial reporting standard, if done correctly can improve the 
overall financial systems of a society and therefore ensure its membership is better 
informed… (Palmerston North Community Services Council) 
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… While the financial reporting requirements might appear onerous for a society with a 
small turnover, Royal Federation believes there are greater advantages and protection 
associated with the requirements of the Bill… [and] … a healthy, positive step towards 
accountable, transparent practices. Royal Federation supports the draft Bills’ 
requirements that incorporated societies meet the same accounting standards as registered 
charities. (Royal Federation of NZ Justices Associations) 
Such practices require internal controls and will likely reduce fraud, although not all agreed 
that mandating financial filing following public-benefit entity standards was necessary. 
The requirements of the [public-benefit entities regulator] to record & present receipts 
may suit for detecting fraud within charities, but must NOT be allowed to spread to non-
charity [mutual-benefit entities], under the guise of being “generally accepted”…  The 
majority of [these] are not registered charities, and should not have to jump through hoops 
that have little relevance. (Alec Knewstubb) 
Twenty one submissions (out of 39) argued against all Incorporated Societies (mutual-benefit 
entities) being required to file according to the new standards, with 13 out of 39 suggesting 
reporting exemptions depending on size (ranging from $500 (1), $10,000 (1), $15,000 (4), 
$20,000 (2), $25,000 (2), $30,000 (1), $50,000 (1), to $125,000 (1) (an average of $28,115)).  
As there was no statistically significant difference between mutual- and public-benefit 
entities reporting on an accrual basis, such comments indicate that mutual-benefit entities 
should be held to a lower level of public accountability:  
We suggest that the financial reporting obligations under the bill are ‘stepped’ by member 
size and income, but that there be a provision for these to be negated by an acceptable 
proportion of members (either 75% or perhaps 90% if this is considered to be a special 
right or obligation) voting at an AGM. (Auckland District Law Society) 
A [mutual-benefit entity] that only deals with and for the benefit of its members should not 
have to publically disclose its accounts. This is similar to the requirements of a private 
company that is not an issuer. (John Bullot) 
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This latter submitter apparently opposes the Incorporated Societies Act (1908) which requires 
all entities to file ‘accounts’.  
With the new Act proposing greater reporting homogeneity, some submitters are also 
concerned that the benefits mutual-benefit entities receive are insufficient to require them to 
be subject to the same reporting requirements as public-benefit entities. An interviewee 
suggested that a mutual-benefit entity might therefore seek to register as a public-benefit 
entity to increase their taxation exemptions, especially if compliance are similar between 
mutual- and public-benefit entities (A3). Others are concerned that entities would go 
‘underground’, noting:  
… requiring [mutual-benefit entities] to meet accounting standards may create a 
disincentive for groups to incorporate. The first risk that this creates is that it is much 
harder to ensure the financial propriety of unincorporated societies. Secondly, the 
difficulty of operating an unincorporated society may cause individuals to eventually 
refrain from carrying out new and needed civil society functions. [We] would like to see 
more a flexible and voluntary accounting standards regime granted to non-charitable 
small incorporated societies (Park Legal Limited) 
This sentiment was also commonly held by interviewees.  
The law changes should help promote the [mutual-benefit] sector, and not unduly hamper 
it… [and create] … a disincentive to forming these organisations, which provide many and 
varied benefits to their communities. Fundamentally it is a breach of the freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association, which should be possible without unnecessary 
compliance costs. (Volunteering New Zealand) 
Consequently the wide support for no mandatory audit, as in the Bill’s Exposure Draft, was 
unsurprising: 
It is also pleasing to see that there is no requirement for audit of an organisations financial 
statements in the Bill. It will be a decision of members and funders of the organisation to 
determine this matter. (Stuart Burns) 
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Nevertheless, an accounting firm believed that both public-benefit and mutual-benefit 
entities should be subject to audit: 
… due to the fiduciary capacity that the governing body has over member’s funds, 
we consider it appropriate for Incorporated Societies to be subject to the same 
audit or review requirements as registered charities. Effectively, there is 
separation between the “owners” and the governing body… Alternatively, 
consideration could be given to the current opt out provisions that are available 
for companies that have more than 10 shareholders. I.e. an Incorporated Society 
could opt out of the audit or review requirements if they obtain support each year 
from 95% or more of the members to do so. (BDO New Zealand) 
Audit enables stakeholders to monitor, although some called for improved government 
monitoring (C2).  Another community interviewee was less positive, noting: 
To my mind, as I have heard it, a lot of the changes … [are] actually to do with the 
workload of the government department administering them. It is always a worry that you 
solve their overwork problems by giving work to others. (C1) 
This interviewee feels that new regulation will incur more regulatory burden on mutual-
benefit entities. Nevertheless, 18 out of 39 fully supported mandatory filing following new 
financial reporting standards and a further 13 supported the use of these standards at differing 
revenue or expenditure levels.  
 
5. Discussion 
Nonprofit entities are important in society in part because they are said to increase cohesion 
and civic-ness (Putnam, 1995). Governments support public-benefit and mutual-benefit 
entities through providing tax exemptions (Abramson et al., 2006; Thiel and Mayer, 2009). 
Yet, these entities’ regulation often differs. Wagner (2012) called for more research into 
nonprofit entities beyond those in the public-benefit entity sector. This research sought to 
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understand differences between mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities and the specific 
aspects of mutual-benefit entities that regulation should acknowledge. It specifically 
considers the sunsetting of an Act for mutual-benefit entities and whether that Act’s 
reinvigoration should increase filing requirements, specifically harmonisation with the 
accounting standards applicable to public-benefit entities.  
This article analysed differences and similarities between the two entity types using 
quantitative and qualitative data from New Zealand, an early adopter of Better Regulation 
and NPM (Kelsey, 2010). It found that mutual-benefit entities’ revenues are mainly from 
members, goods and services delivered to members and non-members, with donations being 
significantly less significant than received by public-benefit entities. Expenditure similarly 
emphasises member activities, rather than public fundraising and grants. While all financial 
flows cannot be entirely categorised by using Buchanan’s (1965) club theory, they suggest a 
strong argument for member monitoring. Further, not only are the proxies for taxation 
foregone from mutual-benefit entities significantly lower than those for public-benefit 
entities, but these entities’ size is also significantly different. Despite size-differences, 
currently both types of entities mainly use accrual accounting, which would suggest that new 
requirements would not be difficult to adhere to.  
There is growing concern for regulation to address fraud, misuse of funds or to increase 
entities’ reputations, including improving the donation ‘market’ (Cordery et al., 2017; 
Tremblay-Boire et al., 2016). Yet, mutual-benefit entities do not operate in a ‘donation 
market’, instead they operate in a ‘member market’ and search for legitimacy. Some of the 
New Zealand interviewees and submitters are aware of the benefits of incorporation, but they 
also note that the great majority of private limited liability companies (for-profit) in New 
Zealand are exempt from public filing. However, for-profit entities are required to file 
financial statements with the tax agency, whereas mutual-benefit entities do not (in New 
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Zealand they file basic statements with another regulator – see table 2). The private nature of 
for-profit entities’ filing is a further argument for mutual-benefit entities to experience lower 
levels of regulation than public-benefit entities.   
The Better Regulation agenda and regulatory reform arises from citizens railing against 
red tape in the face of increased regulation, and that which is deemed to be unfair (Radaelli 
and Meuwese, 2009). In the reinvigorating of an Act that is over a century old, it could be 
expected that significant changes are required, particularly in public disclosures. This paper 
has shown that only 20% (8/39) submitters were completely against requiring mutual-benefit 
entities to provide greater reporting and at similar levels to those of public-benefit entities, 
with 80% in favour, but one-third (13/39) suggesting further relief for size. A large minority 
of submitters note the benefits of appropriate reporting standards for mutual-benefit entities 
to develop greater member accountability and better financial management; and that these 
benefits will assist members and the regulator to act in the public interest.  
Others emphasized the member focus of mutual-benefit entities and the desire for self-
regulation, especially as the current regulatory monitoring is deemed to be poor. Prior 
research has shown deterrence is a necessary aspect of good regulation (for example, Stewart 
and Faulk, 2014; Winter and May, 2001), but this is not occurring. In light of mutual-benefit 
entities’ experience of very low levels of monitoring, some believe that renewed government 
interest in stronger regulation threatens their independence. Those who are unsupportive are 
reflected in the ethos of Better Regulation, that the costs of regulation should not exceed the 
benefits (Bunea and Ibenskas, 2017; Coletti and Radaelli, 2015; De Jong and Witteloostuijn, 
2015).  
Although those against greater filing obligations desire less government regulation, they 
may not be prepared to lose the benefits of limited liability and perpetual succession, or their 
tax relief on non-business surpluses. The quantitative analysis shows that mutual-benefit 
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entities are mainly privately funded for the benefit of members (see club theory espoused by 
Buchanan, 1965; Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997); they are smaller than public-benefit entities 
on average; and therefore receive fewer tax exemptions. (Size is already recognised in 
regulation - see Table 2, column 2). It is these characteristics that would argue for lighter 
touch regulation, and certainly the theory would suggest that the members who fund mutual-
benefit entities are best suited to regulate them, and that further regulation is not required.  
Nevertheless, the new filing requirements have strong support and this is likely based on 
historic reasons, because the 1908 Act required all entities to file (Cordery et al., 2016). 
However, low levels of regulatory monitoring are likely to have reduced incorporated 
societies belief in regulation overall. The authors’ analysis of filings suggests that member-
monitoring of these mutual-benefit entities is also low.  
If the government is to push for harmonisation of filing requirements (but not audit) 
between mutual-benefit and public=benefit entities, it needs to highlight the benefits of 
incorporation (limited liability and perpetual succession, along with the taxation benefits) 
(rather than self-regulation as seen in Prakash and Potowski, 2007). The regulator and 
regulatees must weigh up the costs to mutual-benefit entities of transitioning to modern 
financial reporting standards against the benefits to these entities, their members and the 
regulators themselves. At the very least, the new Act should consider including de-minimis 
requirements at which these entities do not have to file reports (as in England and Wales – 
Cordery et al., 2016). This could be based on the average suggested by submitters ($28,115) 
or better still, the mean of smaller member-based entities ($12,000. This is extrapolated from 
the mean of $11928 from note 3, table 3).  
 While there are limitations in using a dataset from one country, the ability to compare 
and contrast mutual- and public-benefit entities in the same jurisdiction has opened a new 
area for future research. Analysing further the costs and benefits of regulation for both of 
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these entity types will be useful not only in New Zealand, but also in other jurisdictions, 
especially since, as noted by Breen et al. (2017), there are strong similarities between 
regulatory regimes internationally. There are also limitations in the different dates of the 
quantitative data observations. Nevertheless, no external shocks were experienced in the 
interim which would suggest that the pattern of income and expenditure would be markedly 
different in the intervals between data collection.  
6. Conclusion  
Nonprofit research focuses almost exclusively on public-benefit entities, rather than other 
sub-sectors. This research has used unique datasets to compare public-benefit and mutual-
benefit entities and present nonprofit sector participants perceptions of these differences in 
context. Buchanan’s (1965) club theory recognises that mutual-benefit entities provide 
predominantly rivalrous goods and thus, are mainly funded and controlled by members who 
pay fees and fund the goods and services they receive (Ben-Ner, 1986; Hansmann, 1986). 
This New Zealand based research confirms this. However, governments may also provide 
members in mutual-benefit entities the benefits of limited liability, perpetual succession and 
tax exemptions, which invoke demands for accountability; therefore members could be 
expected to value an independent regulator. Prior research has not considered how mutual-
benefit entities differ from public-benefit entities in terms of size and financial structure and 
how and to whom they should report and be regulated. These characteristics are in contrast to 
public-benefit entities which are more likely to redistribute social wealth, be mainly funded 
by donations and commercial services and be managed by professionals. Public-benefit 
entities are expected to act in the public interest. The differences between these 
characteristics are important for designing regulation.   
This research argues that members should be the primary monitoring agency/ies for 
mutual-benefit entities, but that financial reports should be understandable to these members.  
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Financial reporting preparation requires a set of standards, such as that already followed by 
public-benefit entities in New Zealand and recommended for mutual-benefit entities (through 
the Incorporated Societies Bill) as seen in this research. Homogeneous accounting standards 
are not an issue, but the differences in size and orientation (towards members) raises concerns 
amongst stakeholders to reduce the burden of new standards. While public-benefit entities 
must prepare accounts and file them with the charities regulator, a lower level of compliance 
is argued for mutual-benefit entities. Congruent with member monitoring, it would be 
reasonable for them to be required to maintain accounting records but not be required to file 
them (as in the UK and US for smaller public-benefit entities) unless they meet a de-minimis 
level of at least $12,000. Government has the right to demand disclosures due to mutual-
benefit entities’ tax concessions, the benefits of their limited liability and perpetual 
succession. Nevertheless, this research has also found that mutual-benefit entities receive 
lower levels of taxation concessions than public-benefit entities and are smaller overall. This 
is a further argument in favour of a de-minimis for their filing in contrast to public-benefit 
entities that receive higher concessions. Other tools in the regulatory box include co-
regulation, to require filing but not publishing the reports (as in Japan) (Cordery and Deguchi, 
2018), or to further simplify standards or requirements to reduce compliance costs.   
By using club theory and comparison data, this research has shown support for 
differentiated regulation that has a theoretical base. This addresses the critique of ‘hodge-
podge’ regulation (Hansmann, 1986) and should be aligned to Better Regulation ideals to 
reduce regulatory costs in comparison to benefits. It also maintains necessary government 
monitoring to ensure efficiency in income redistribution and fraud protection. International 
comparative research would also help in developing better measures of costs and benefits.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1: List of interviewees and roles 
Label Representing Role 
A1 Accounting profession Partner Medium-sized firm 
A2 Accounting profession Partner Big 4 
A3 Accounting profession Senior Manager Big 4 
A4 Accounting profession Partner Medium-sized firm 
A5 Accounting profession Partner Medium-sized firm 
A6 Accounting profession Partner Big 4 
C1 Community representative CEO Community peak body 
C2 Community representative CEO Association peak body 
C3 Community representative Capacity Builder consultant 
C4 Community representative Capacity Builder peak body 
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Table 1: Aspects of public-benefit and mutual-benefit entities from the literature 
Entity type Activities/Goods & 
Services 
Funding  Control  
Public-benefit Mainly non-rivalrous 
publicly focused 
Donations and 
commercial 
Professional and/or 
members 
Mutual-benefit Predominantly 
rivalrous, includes 
advocacy 
Member fees and 
commercial 
Members and/or 
professional 
 
35 
 
Table 2: Comparing public-benefit entities to mutual-benefit entities 
Variable 
Public-benefit entities 
(charities) 
Mutual-benefit entities 
(membership-based) 
Membership requirement 0 15 at registration 
Member Liability  Depends on form chosen Limited liability 
Tax exemptions All income and also donee status 
(exemption on donations) 
Member profits tax-exempt. No 
donee status 
Distributions allowed? Non-distribution constraint Non-distribution constraint 
Regulator Charities Services (Department 
of Internal Affairs) 
Incorporated Societies Registrar 
(Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and Employment) 
Accounting requirements 
for annual filing (all sizes 
of entities) 
Cash for <NZD125,000 
expenditure p.a.; accrual (3 tiers 
of increasingly complex 
requirements) above that. 
Assurance above $500,000 
Profit and loss and balance sheet 
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Table 3: Comparing the samples and the population of public-benefit entities and extrapolating 
the sample to the population for mutual-benefit entities 
Expenditure levels 
Public-benefit entities  Sample 
% of Popn 
Mutual-benefit entities  Sample 
%  Sample  Population Sample  Population
2
 
Less than 
NZD40,000  
379 
(52.4%) 
10,3781 
(53.5%)3 
3.65% 520 
(69.9%) 
9,043 
(69.9%) 
5.75% 
More than 
NZD40,000  
417 
(47.6%) 
9,019 
(46.5%)3 
4.62% 
 
 224 
(30.1%) 
3,895 
(30.1%) 
5.75% 
 796 
(100%) 
19,397 
(100%) 
4.10% 744 
(100%) 
12,938 
(100%) 
5.75% 
1. This is the population of 11,282 less the estimated number of entities with zero expenditure as 
extrapolated from our sample. 
2. The population was estimated from the data collected from the random sample of non-charitable 
entities with more than zero expenditure (as noted above).  
3. The mean of sampled entities’ expenditures for public benefit entities with less than 
$40,000 in annual expenditure was $14,381 (SD 11324) and mutual-benefit entities 
$11928 (SD 10408). For those with more than $40,000 in annual expenditure the 
relative means were $262165 (SD349309) and $228475 (SD325681) respectively 
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Table 4: Categorisation of submitters on Incorporated Societies Bill and issues raised 
Type of submitter 
Audit 
issues 
Accoun
-ting 
issues 
Support 
Bill 
Do not 
support 
Bill 
Total Number 
of Submissions 
Accounting & Law Firms 3 5 12 0 14 
Professional Associations 3 9 23 3 35 
Sports & Culture Associations 0 10 15 3 26 
Health & Social Services 
Associations 
0 7 10 0 12 
Funder & Capacity Builder 0 1 6 0 8 
Individual 3 6 10 2 15 
Regulator/Government  1 1 1 0 4 
Total 10 39 77 8 114 
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Table 5: Classification of sample of mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities 
Main sector 
Public-benefit 
Entity population 
Public-benefit Entity 
sample 
Mutual-benefit 
Entity sample 
Number 
in sector 
% in 
sector 
Number 
in sector 
% in 
sector 
Number 
in sector 
% in 
sector 
1. Culture and recreation 3,026 13.78% 162 20.40% 538 71.64% 
2. Education and research 4,450 20.26% 79 9.95% 7 0.93% 
3. Health 1,565 7.12% 86 10.83% 1 0.13% 
4. Social Services 2,782 12.66% 193 24.31% 11 1.46% 
5. Environment 715 3.25% 14 1.76% 11 1.46% 
6. Development & housing 1,877 8.54% 109 13.70% 93 12.38% 
7. Law, advocacy & politics 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 22 2.93% 
8. Grant making/fundraising 
& voluntarism promotion 
773 3.52% 89 11.21% 1 0.13% 
9. International 43 0.20% 0 0.00% 0 0.0% 
10. Religion 3,428 15.61% 34 4.28% 3 0.40% 
11. Business and 
professional associations 
0 0.00% 0 0.00% 64 8.52% 
12. Other 3,308 15.06% 29 3.65% 0 0.00% 
Grand Total 21,967 100.00% 795 100.00% 751 100.00% 
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Table 6: Expenditure categories in mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities (percentages).  
Revenue Source Mutual- or Public-
benefit 
N Mean 
% 
Std. 
Deviation 
2-sample 
t test 
P value 
Fundraising 
costs 
Mutual-benefit 751 0. 88 5.09 t(1545) = 
-5.308 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 3.34 11.71 
Grants made Mutual-benefit 751 3.02 11.63 t(1369) = 
-2.707 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 14.61 29.76 
Staff costs Mutual-benefit 751 7.59 17.17 t(1545) = 
-7.168 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 15.69 26.08 
Overhead (incl. 
financing, dep-
reciation, rent) 
Mutual-benefit 747 32.50 29.47 t(1545) = 
-3.339 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 786 37.79 32.61 
Goods and 
Services 
Mutual-benefit 751 44.43 31.63 t(1545) = 
15.657 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 20.86 27.52 
Member costs 
(affiliation, bad 
debts) 
Mutual-benefit 751 7.73 15.19 t(1545) = 
14.303 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 0.03 .272 
Other Mutual-benefit 751 3.84 11.94 t(1545) = 
-3.339 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 7.68 19.64 
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Table 7: Revenue sources in mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities (percentages).  
Revenue Source Mutual- or 
Public-benefit 
N Mean 
% 
Std. 
Deviation 
2-sample 
t test 
P value 
Public Donations Mutual-benefit 751 20.53 27.13 t(1423) = 
-15.652, p  
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 47.12 38.96 
Bequests Mutual-benefit 751 0.00 0.079 t(795) =  
-2.187 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 0.38 4.73 
Investments Mutual-benefit 751 5.09 13.85 t(1151) = 
-7.720 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 13.98 29.18 
Goods and 
Services 
Mutual-benefit 751 39.75 33.02 t(1523) = 
11.401 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 21.15 31.04 
Rental Mutual-benefit 751 2.75 10.71 t(1369) = 
-2.707 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 4.66 16.60 
Sponsorship Mutual-benefit 747 3.05 10.63 t(1149) = 
4.729 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 786 0.96 5.87 
Members Mutual-benefit 751 28.39 30.17 t(1053) = 
19.295 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 5.03 14.21 
Other Mutual-benefit 751 2.97 11.28 t(1452) = 
-3.680 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 5.49 15.50 
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Table 8: Comparisons of surplus, taxation and reserves between mutual-benefit and public-benefit 
entities.  
Measure Mutual- or 
Public-benefit 
N Mean  
NZ$ 
Std. 
Deviation 
Median Wilco-
xon  
P 
value 
Surplus 
($) 
Mutual-benefit 751 3435.31 39794.48 308.94  
Z =  
-3.120    
 
0.002 Public-benefit 796 34305.35 309206.83 1119.17 
Total 1547 19319.31 223989.74 647.58 
Proxy 
taxation 
at 28% on 
surplus 
Mutual-benefit 751 961.89 11142.45 86.50  
Z = 
-3.120 
 
0.002 Public-benefit 796 9605.50 86577.91 313.37 
Total 1547 5409.41 62717.13 181.32 
Reserves 
(months) 
Mutual-benefit 751 35.71 122.27 9.01  
Z =  
-2.880 
 
  0.004 Public-benefit 796 662.33 11395.04 9.95 
Total 1546 357.94 8175.32 9.57 
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Table 9: Size comparisons between mutual-benefit and public-benefit entities.  
Size metric Mutual- or 
Public-benefit 
N Mean NZ$ Std. 
Deviation 
2-sample 
t test 
P value 
Gross Revenue Mutual-benefit 751 81207.47 210334.52 t(1159)=  
-5.647 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 178856.29 437169.95 
Gross 
Expenditure 
Mutual-benefit 751 77544.97 204789.09 t(1452)= 
-5.372 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 144550.94 281744.86 
Total Assets Mutual-benefit 751 165304.31 435868.82 t(871)= 
-6.166 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 623051.54 2045964.35 
Total Liabilities Mutual-benefit 751 17270.87 72325.75 t(815) = 
-3.466 
 
0.001 Public-benefit 796 99271.24 663363.17 
Total Equity Mutual-benefit 751 155468.07 535368.05 t(947)=  
-5.293 
 
< 0.0005 Public-benefit 796 503036.37 1768758.15 
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Figure 1 Graph of expenditure categories 
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Figure 2: Graph of revenue sources 
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